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HARD ROCK MINING ON THE PUBLIC LAND:
A TIME FOR COMPROMISE
With little aid from the courts, the industry must rely on legis-
lative reform to solve its problems. But will Congress be con-
tent to amend the 1872 law, or will it abolish the system
altogether? Therein lies the problem, and so the mining in-
dustry clings fervently to an outmoded law, preferring the
troublesome present to an unknown future.'
I. EXPANDED PRE-DISCOVERY PROTECTION
The doctrine ofpedspossessio2 evolved as a judicial solution to a
significant legislative deficiency in the Mining Law of 18721; the Min-
ing Act's failure to protect the mining claims of prospectors on the pub-
lic land4 prior to discovery.' The doctrine ofpedispossessio protected a
mineral prospector's pre-discovery claim from being usurped by an-
1. Harris, The Law ofMillsites.: History andlpplication, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 103, 142-
43 (1976).
2. The literal meaning ofpedispossesslo is: "A foothold; an actual possession." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1019 (5th ed. 1979). This meaning probably played a significant role in how
courts decided to apply the doctrine to the Mining Law of 1872, and may also be one reason for
the reluctance to expand the scope of the doctrine's protection.
3. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1976).
4. The scope of this paper is limited to hard rock mining on the public land because the
topic of this comment, the doctrine ofpedispossessio and the related Mining Law of 1872, pertains
only to hard rock mining on the public land. Approximately one-third of the land in the United
States is publicly owned land and nearly 68 percent of this land (over 740 million acres) is open
for hard rock mining. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, HARD ROCK MINING ON THE
PUBLIC LAND 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY]. This information was
obtained from A.E. Paladino, Program Manager, Material Assessment Program, Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Statementfor the Record of the Department of Interior!s Hear-
ings on the Availability of Federal Landsfor Mineral Exploration and Development (October 15,
1976).
The term "hard rock mining" in this comment refers to the mining of solid minerals rather
than minerals found in a gaseous or liquid state. However, not all solid minerals are included in
this discussion. Only those minerals presently covered by the Mining Law of 1872, such as cop-
per, zinc, silver, gold and uranium are included. For a listing of some solid substances not covered
by the Mining Law of 1872, see the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287, 181
(1976), and the Surface Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-615, 611 (1976).
5. The Mining Law of 1872 provides no protection for a miner's claim until an actual dis-
covery of a valuable mineral has been made. See 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1976) (originally enacted as Act
of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 2, 17 Stat. 91) which provides: "[N]o location of a mining claim shall
be made until the discovery of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located." Id. Some
courts did begin to recognize the propriety of marking and locating a claim prior to discovery
despite the language of the statute. This, however, did not affect the role ofpedispossesslo. See
notes 51-54 & 112 infra and accompanying text.
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other party6 provided that the prospector: (1) was in actual possession
of the site; (2) was diligently working towards discovery; and (3) ex-
cluded others from the site.7 The doctrine ofpedispossessio was not
intended to exist independently8 ; its sole purpose was to facilitate the
achievement of the Act's purpose, which was to encourage mineral ex-
ploration on the public land.9
Initially, courts applied the three elements ofpedispossessio very
narrowly in keeping with nineteenth century mining practices. Most
courts held that the doctrine's protection only extended to the immedi-
ate area upon which the prospector was working, but gradually courts
began to expand the doctrine's protection to the full limits of each
claim."o There were two reasons for the initial conservative application
of the doctrine. First, there was the danger that the doctrine would be
misused by persons seeking to appropriate large areas of the public
land for purposes other than mining;'I and secondly, mining at that
6. The doctrine ofpedispossessio does not protect a mineral prospector from removal action
by the United States. A prospector's status on the public land prior to discovery, as against the
United States, is that of a licensee or tenant at will. See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346
(1918). Contra, United States v. Deasy, 24 F.2d 108, 111 (D. Idaho 1928). For a critical discussion
of the doctrine ofpedispossessio and its application to the United States, as the land owner, see
Tognoni, Rule of Man vs. The American Mining Laws: The Persecution and Elimination of the
Small Miner on Public Lands in the United States, 55 N.D.L. REv. 339, 347-50 (1979).
7. Fiske, Pedis Possessio-Modern Use of an Old Concept, 15 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
181, 191 (1969). The author also succinctly summarizes the doctrine ofpedispossessio:
The doctrine [of pedis possessio] pertains to possessory rights existing prior to the
discovery of a valuable mineral in a mining claim ...
[It] is not an elaborate doctrine nor a complex system of rules and concepts.
The classic discourse on it is in. . . Union Oil Co. v. Smith, in which the theory [ofpedis
possessio] was recognized as providing that if a qualified person peaceably and in good
faith enters vacant, unappropriated public domain for the purpose of exploring for and
discovering a valuable mineral. . . he may exclusively hold the place where he is work-
ing against those having no better right,. . . so long as he remains in continuous, exclu-
sive occupancy and diligently and in good faith prosecutes work directed toward making
a discovery.
Id. at 182-83 (footnote omitted).
8. Fiske also explains the relationship between the doctrine ofpedispossessio and the Min-
ing Law of 1872:
The concept of such pre-discovery rights or protection is merely adjunct to the [Mining
Law of 1872] .... Pedis possessio has no independent existence or purpose, and no
permanent consequence of its own. It is not a title and does not accomplish the vesting
of any title or permanent rights. It is no more than a device to implement the [Mining
Law of 1872].
It follows, therefore, that the scope and operation of pedis possessio must be consis-
tent with the existing principles of the [Mining Law of 1872].
Id. at 183-84 (footnotes omitted).
9. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 4, at 3.
10. Fiske, supra note 7, at 187-88. For a discussion of the cases involved and the reason for
the change, see notes 48-54 infra and accompanying text.
11. Id. at 186-87.
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time consisted mainly of "pick and shovel" searches for outcroppings
and shallow mineral deposits, usually by a solitary miner.'" Today,
most, if not all, of these easily accessible minerals have been discov-
ered.13 Advances in mining technology, however, have made deeper
deposits of minerals accessible but with a corresponding increase in
costs. To recover these costs, today's miner must mine larger areas of
the public land. But when he has sought to protect these larger areas of
land prior to discovery, he has found most courts unwilling to extend
the doctrine ofpedispossessio beyond each individual claim' 4 unless
the prospector satisfies all three elements of the doctrine on every claim
in the area he wants protected. 5 The economic and operational im-
practicality of this individual claim requirement precludes many min-
ers from receiving the doctrine's pre-discovery protection resulting in
greatly inhibited mineral exploration. The prospect of having one's
claims appropriated by another before mining operations commence
makes even the most adventurous mineral explorer cautious because of
the economic risk involved.' 6 The disconcerting, anomalous result is
that, in effect, the doctrine ofpedispossessio no longer encourages min-
eral exploration but actually discourages it.
In facing this result, courts have either expanded the scope of the
protection afforded by the doctrine ofpedispossessio 17 or have mani-
fested an apparent willingness to do so 8 without requiring the prospec-
tor to satisfy the doctrine's elements on every claim located in the
mining area. The propriety of this expansion was to have been consid-
ered by the United States Supreme Court during its 1980 term,' 9 but
the appellant, a uranium prospector, dismissed the case under Supreme
Court Rule 53.20 Although this action appears anomalous at first,
12. Id.
13. Ladendorff, Enlarging Prediscovery Rights ofMineral Locaters, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INsT. 1, 1 (1961).
14. 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) imposes a maximum claim size of 20 acres.
15. See, e.g., Ranchers Exploration & Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 721-22
(D. Utah 1965).
16. See Fiske supra note 7, at 210-22.
17. MacGuire v. Sturgis, 347 F. Supp. 580 (D. Wyo. 1971).
18. Continental Oil Co. v. Natrona Service, Inc., 588 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1978).
19. Geomet Exploration v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 60, 601 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App.
1979), rev'd, 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3009, appeal dismissed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3173 (Sept. 23, 1980) (pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 53, 9-12-80).
20. Supreme Court Rule 53 provides for the dismissal of cases before the Supreme Court
either upon the motion of both parties or upon the motion of the appellant or petitioner in the
case. The rule states, in part:
.1. Whenever the parties thereto, at any stage of the proceedings, file with the Clerk an
agreement in writing that any cause be dismissed, specifying the terms with respect to
[Vol. 16:488
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closer examination suggests that the action may have been taken only
after the risks involved had been carefully weighed; not only from an
adverse decision, but also from possible public criticism engendered
from a favorable one."
Two federal courts, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
District Court of Wyoming, both having jurisdiction in an area where
much of the known uranium deposits are located,2 either had upheld
an expanded application ofpedispossessio or had manifested a will-
ingness to do so.24 An adverse ruling by the Supreme Court would
have eliminated these two important gains. Conversely, a favorable
ruling, while initially being a boon to public land hard rock mining,
would also have spawned a tumultuous outcry by environmentalists
opposed to the Mining Law of 1872's policy of free access to the public
costs, and pay to the Clerk any fees that may be due, the Clerk,. .. shall enter an order
of dismissal.
.2.(a) Whenever an appellant or petitioner in this Court files with the Clerk a motion
to dismiss a cause to which he is a party, with proof of service as prescribed by Rule 28,
and tenders to the Clerk any fees and costs that may be due, the adverse party. . . may
file an objection, limited to the quantum of damages and costs in this Court alleged to be
payable, or, in a proper case, to a showing that the moving party does not represent all
appellants or petitioners if there are more than one.
(c) If no objection is filed, or if upon objection going only to the quantum of dam-
ages and costs in this Court, the party moving for dismissal. . . shall tender the whole of
such additional damages and costs demanded, the Clerk, .... shall enter an order of
dismissal.
SUP. CT. R. 53.
21. John C. Lacy, attorney for appellant Lucky Me Uranium Corp., said he fied the motion
for voluntary dismissal under Supreme Court Rule 53 (2) at the request of his client after the
Arizona Mining Association, which had filed an amicus curiae brief, withdrew its support from the
case. Telephone conversation with John C. Lacy, of the firm of DeConcini, McDonald, Brammer
and Yewtin, Tucson, Arizona (January 22, 1981).
C. J. Hansen, President of the Arizona Mining Association, declined to give the reason for the
Association's withdrawal but did say they were not happy with the Arizona Supreme Court's
decision in Lucky Mc Uranium, which upheld the traditional narrow application of pedisposses-
s/v. Telephone conversation with C. J. Hansen, President of the Arizona Mining Association
(January 22, 1981).
Whatever the real reason was for this dismissal, it must have been significant because the
facts in Lucky Mr Uranium provided the Supreme with what one writer had portrayed in a hypo-
thetical as the perfect case for judicial resolution of the scope of the doctrine ofpedis possessio.
See Note, Monopoi'zation of the Public Land or Necessary Liberalization of Exploration Laws?, 20
NAT. RESOURCES J. 387, 392-93 (1980). The lateness of the dismissal (ie., after certiorari had
already been granted) also suggests that the decision to dismiss was not made arbitrarily.
22. Four states make up the area where much of the known deposits of uranium are located:
Colorado; New Mexico; Utah; and Wyoming. All of these are within the jurisdiction of the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals and, of course, Wyoming is in the jurisdiction of the Wyoming Federal
District Court. See Friedman, Environmental Problems Relating to Uranium Mining and Milling,
Appendix A (1978) (copy on file in TULSA LAW JOURNAL offices).
23. See note 17 supra.
24. See note 18 supra.
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land for mineral exploration,2" and may have created an atmosphere
wherein these opponents could have successfully pressed for the repeal
of the Mining Law of 1872 and the substitution of a leasing system in
its place.26 The decision to dismiss the appeal, however, left Arizona
miners with a decision they disliked, and also left the future ofFedis
possessio and, thus, the Mining Law of 1872 unclear. Additionally, any
future favorable court decision will probably evoke the same opposi-
tion and create the same risks; thus some other satisfactory resolution
must be reached.
The need for a satisfactory solution to this dilemma coincides with
an even more critical problem that must soon be resolved: our coun-
try's dependence on foreign sources for both "fuel and nonfuel miner-
als." 27 Hard rock mining in the United States must be increased to
alleviate this foreign dependence and to do this, the mining industry
25. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
Except as otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and
purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens
of the United States and those who have declared their intention to become such, under
regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in
the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with
the laws of the United States.
Id.
26. For a discussion of leasing, see notes 89-98 infra and accompanying text.
27. "Fuel minerals" refers to energy producing minerals and "non-fuel minerals" refers to
minerals that are not energy producing. See SUBCOMM. ON MINES AND MINING OF THE COMM.
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON U.S. MINERAL VULNER-
ABILITY: NATIONAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS, VII-8 (Comm. Print No. 9, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
U.S. MINERAL VULNERABILITY].
There is an emerging awareness in this nation that oil is not the only mineral in
short supply. Access to non fuel minerals cannot be left to chance in view of the critical
role these resources play in our defense, economy, and everyday lives. Our foreign poli-
cies must incorporate the realities of our import dependence problems.
Letter from the Honorable Morris K. Udal, Chairman, to the members of the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs (undated), reprinted in id. at III.
The following chart, although not limited to hard rock minerals, illustrates the United States'
dependence on foreign mineral sources and the quantity of each mineral on Federal lands (public
land) vs. non-Federal land.
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must be encouraged to increase exploration activities.2" Expansion of
RESERVES, RESOURCES OF SELECTED MINERAL COMMODITIES, AND
POTENTIAL FEDERAL LAND CONTRIBUTION
Imports ex-
ceed 50 per-
Reserves at cent of 1976
current Hypothetical Potential Federal domestic
Mineral commodities prices' resources2 versus non-Federal 3 consumption*
10Aluminum (million short tons) ...
Antimony (thousand short tons) ..
Beryllium (thousand short tons)...
Bismuth (million pounds) ........
Cadmium (million pounds) ......
Chromium (million short tons) ...
Coal (billion short tons) .........
Cobalt (million pounds) .........
Copper (million short tons) ......
Fluorine (million short tons) .....
Gold (million troy ounces) .......
Graphite (million short tons) .....
Gypsum (million short tons) .....
Iron (billion short tons) .........
Lead (million short tons) ........
Manganese (million short tons) ...
Mercury (thousand flasks) .......
Molybdenum (billion pounds) ....
Natural gas (trillion cubic feet) ...
Nickel (million pounds) .........
Petroleum (million barrels) ......
Phosphate rock (million short
tons) .........................
Potash (K20eg.)(million short tons)
Soda ash (billion short tons) .....
Silver (million troy ounces) ......
Titanium (million short tons) .....
Tungsten (million bounds) .......
Uranium (U308)(thousand short
tons) .........................
Vanadium (thousand short tons) ..
Zinc (million short tons) ........
Very large .... Major .......... (*)
Small ....... Major .......................
Huge ........ Major .......................
NA ......... Major .......... ()
NA ......... Major .......... ()
Insignificant . Major .......... (*)
Huge ........ Medium .....................
NA ......... Major .......... ()
Large ....... Major .......................
Small ....... Major .......... (*)
NA ......... Major .......... (*)
Very large .... Minor .......................
Huge ........ M ajor .......................
Huge ........ Medium .....................
Moderate .... Major .......................
NA ......... Major .......... ()
NA ......... Major .......... ()
Huge ........ M ajor .......................
Large ....... Medium (onshore) ............
Moderate .... Major .......... ()
Large ....... Medium (onshore) ............
Very large .... Major .......................
Huge ........ Medium .....................
Huge ........ M ajor .......................
Moderate .... Major .......................
Very large .... Medium ........ ()
Moderate .... Major ........... ()
Large ....... M ajor .......................
NA ......... M ajor .......................
Very large .... Medium .....................
I USBM estimate 1973.
2 Resources appraisal terms: Huge-domestic resources are greater than 10 times the minimum antici-
pated cumulative demand (MACD) between 1971 and 2000; very large-domestic resources are 2 to 10 times
the MACD; large-domestic resources are approximately 75 percent to twice the MACD; moderate-domestic
resources are approximately 35 to 75 percent of the MACD; small-domestic resources are approximately 10 to
25 percent of the MACD.
3 Hypothetical resources. They are undiscovered by geologically predictable deposits of materials which
are essentially well known as to location, extent and grade and which may be expolitable in the future under
more favorable economic conditions or with improvements in technology.
4 Reserve base.
5 AT $30 per pound.
Source: Modifications of data in final report of the National Commission on Materials Policy, June 1973,
for Department of Interior Task Force Report on Minerals Availability.
Id. at 62.
28. The Honorable James D. Santini, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining
commented on the current status of the mining industry and the result if this status is not changed:
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the pre-discovery protection of thepedipossessio doctrine would pro-
mote an increase in mineral exploration activities by providing pros-
pectors with greater protection for their financial investment prior to
discovery. However, any attempt to expand the doctrine's protection
must address, and attempt to satisfy, the objections of the leasing advo-
cates.29 It is this comment's position that legislation is the best vehicle
for achieving an acceptable compromise, even though previous legisla-
tive bids have failed to do so.3" Our growing energy needs, an acute
awareness of our country's need to become less reliant on foreign min-
eral resources, and the replacement of a pro-leasing administration 3
with the more conservative Reagan administration may soon create an
atmosphere more conducive to legislative action.
II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF Pedis Possessio
The original Mining Law of 187232 evolved from the consolida-
tion33 of the Lode Law of 186614 and the Placer Act of 1870. 35 Prior to
1866, the federal government did not have an effective uniform policy
regulating mineral prospector access to the public land; however, this
did not prevent exploration of the public land.36 Faced with choosing
between declaring invalid already existing mining claims on the public
land and legalizing these claims, Congress opted for the latter, less
problematic approach. 37 The Mining Law of 1872 and its two forerun-
Our domestic [mining] industry is continually eroding, in large part due to governmental
impediments to profitable operations. Tax policies, environmental regulations, and
withdrawal of Federal lands have marked the demise of a viable American mining in-
dustry. If this trend continues, this Nation will be forced into compromising positions by
foreign governments who control the flow of minerals to our borders.
Letter from James D. Santini to the Honorable Morris K. Udall (September 8, 1980), reprinted in
id. at IV.
29. See notes 89-98 infra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Mining Law Reform: Hearings on H.R, 5831 and H.R. 9292 Before the Sub.
comm. on Interior andInsular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
H. 5831 and H. 9292].
31. Id. H.R. 9292 was the Carter Administration's bill, and would have repealed the Mining
Law of 1872 and replaced it with a leasing system.
32. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-16, 17 Stat. 91 (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54
(1976)).
33. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 4, at 3; 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING § 1.17
(1980).
34. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, §§ 1-11, 14 Stat. 251 (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54
(1976)).
35. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, §§ 12-17, 16 Stat. 217 (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54
(1976)).
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ners, therefore, were essentially a codification of 1872 customs and
mining practices.3 8
The purpose of the 1872 Mining Law was to promote mineral ex-
ploration on the public land,39 and towards this accomplishment the
Act provided free access to the public land4" with the promise of own-
ership upon mineral discovery and the patenting of the claim.4 Prior
to discovery, the Act provided no protection to a mineral prospector;
and while this was consistent with the policy of free access to the public
land, it had an inhibiting effect on public land mineral exploration,
because the risk of being "claim-jumped"42 discouraged many would-
38. The United States Supreme Court in Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878) discussed these
customs and practices, their development and their adoption in the Lode Law of 1866:
The object of the section [§ 9 of the Lode Law of 1866] was to give the sanction of the
United States, the proprietor of the lands, to possessory rights, which had previously
rested solely upon the local customs, laws, anddecisions of the courts, and to prevent
such rights from being lost on a sale of the lands. The section is to be read in connection
with other provisions of the act of which it is a part, and in the light of matters of public
history relating to the mineral lands of the United States. The discovery of gold in Cali-
fornia was followed, as is well known, by an immense immigration into the State ....
The lands in which the precious metals were found belonged to the United States, and
were unsurveyed, and not open, by law, to occupation and settlement. Little was known
of them further than that they were situated in the Sierra Nevada mountains. Into these
mountains the emigrants in vast numbers penetrated, occupying the ravines, gulches,
and cations, and probing the earth in all directions for the precious metals. . . . In every
district which they occupied they framed certain rules ... .by which the extent of
ground they could severally hold for mining was designated, their possessory right to
such ground secured and enforced, and contests between them either avoided or deter-
mined. These rules bore a marked similarity, varying in the several districts only accord-
ing to the extent and character of the mines; distinct provisions being made for different
kinds of mining, such as placer mining, quartz mining, and mining in drifts or tunnels.
They all recognized discovery, followed by appropriation, as the foundation of the pos-
sessor's title, and development by working as the condition of its retention. And they
were so framed as to secure to all comers, within practicable limits, absolute equality of
right and privilege in working the mines. Nothing but such equality would have been
tolerated by the miners, who were emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining,
upon the public lands in the State. The first appropriator was everywhere held to have,
within certain well-defined limits, a better right than others to the claims taken up; and
in all controversies, except as against the government, he was regarded as the original
owner, from whom title was to be traced. . . . [The act [Lode Law of 1866] continued
the system of free mining, holding the mineral lands open to exploration and occupation,
subject to legislation by Congress and to local rules. It merely recognized the obligation
of the government to respect private rights which had grown up under its tacit consent
and approval. It proposed no new system, but sanctioned, regulated, and confirmed a
system already established, to which the people were attached.
Id. at 456-59 (citation omitted).
39. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 4, at 3.
40. Act of 1872, ch. 152, § 1, 17 Stat. 91 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976)). See note
25 supra for the language of the statute.
41. Act of 1872, ch. 152, § 6, 17 Stat. 92 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1976)).
42. "Claim-jumped" is a term that developed during the 19th century to refer to the illegal
act of taking, often by force, of a mining claim from the prospector legally entitled to possess that
claim.
8




The courts' responded to this deficiency in the Mining Law of 1872
by creating the doctrine ofpedispossessio. The language cited most
often as illustrating the doctrine's purpose comes from the United
States Supreme Court in Union Oil Co. v. Smith:'
[A]s a practical matter, exploration must precede the discov-
ery of minerals, and some occupation of the land ordinarily is
necessary for adequate and systematic exploration, legal rec-
ognition of the pedispossessio of a bona fide and qualified
prospector is universally regarded as a necessity. It is held
that upon the public domain a miner may hold the place in
which he may be working against all others having no better
right, and while he remains in possession, diligently working
towards discovery, is entitled-at least for a reasonable
time-to be protected against forcible, fraudulent, and clan-
destine intrusions upon his possession.45
Union Oil also established the essential elements of thepedispos-
sessio doctrine which must be met before the doctrine can be used to
protect a pre-discovery mining claim. These elements are:
(1) Actual possession of the ground;
(2) Diligent prosecution of work towards discovery; and
(3) Exclusion of others.46
Traditionally, the actual possession element of the doctrine ofpedispos-
sessio was construed only to protect the ground upon which a prospec-
tor was actually working. The doctrine's protection did not extend to
the full limits of the miner's claim. 47 Around the turn of the century,
however, some courts began to manifest a willingness to extend the
protection of pedis possessio to the full extent of a miner's claim. 8
These cases involved the exploration for oil on the public land which,
at that time, was still within the scope of the Mining Law of 1872.49
43. Fiske, .supra note 7, at 186.
44. 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
45. Id. at 346-47.
46. See Fiske, supra note 7, at 190-91.
47. Zollars v. Evans, 5 F. 172 (C.C.D. Colo. 1880). "On the public domain of the United
States a miner may hold the place in which he may be working against all others having no better
right. But when he asserts title to a full claim .... he must prove a lode [discovery of a mineral]
extending throughout the claim." Id. at 173. Accord, Hanson v. Craig, 170 F. 62 (9th Cir. 1909);
Gemmel v. Swain, 28 Mont. 331, 72 P. 662 (1903).
48. See Biglow v. Conradt, 159 F. 868 (9th Cir. 1908); McLemore v. Express Oil Co., 158 Cal.
559, 112 P. 59 (1910); Miller v. Chrisman, 140 Cal. 440, 73 P. 1083 (1903), aj'd, 197 U.S. 313
(1905); Phillips v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 95 P. 856 (1908).
49. Oil was removed from the Mining Law of 1872 by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch.
85 § 1, 41 Stat. 437 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976)). The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
[Vol. 16:488
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Deeper deposits of oil were being sought, more sophisticated explora-
tion equipment was being utilized, and larger areas of the public land
were being explored." Oil prospectors needed more protection for
their interests prior to discovery and the courts responded by recogniz-
ing the propriety of marking and recording claims prior to discovery,
and by extending the protection of the doctrine ofpedispossessio to the
full limits of such claims. 1 In 1919, the Supreme Court in Union Oil
Co. v. Smith52 recognized these advances, 53 but cautioned that:
"Whatever the nature and extent of a possessory right before discovery,
all authorities agree that such possession may be maintained only by
continued actual occupancy by a qualified locator. . engaged in per-
sistent and diligent prosecution of work looking to the discovery of
mineral."54
The Supreme Court's comments in Union Oil Co. concerning the
doctrine ofpedispossessio have nearly acquired the stature of control-
ling precedent, despite the fact that they were dicta." The language in
was essentially congress' response to a national movement urging conservation of certain miner-
als, including oil. See Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 245 (1942).
50. Fiske, supra note 7, at 188.
51. See Erwin v. Perego, 93 F. 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1899), where the court stated, "[m]oreover,
there is no requirement in the legislation of congress [Mining Law of 1872] that the discovery shall
be made before the location, or that the location shall precede the discovery." Id. See also Miller
v. Chrisman, 140 Cal. 440, 73 P. 1083 (1903) where the court stated:
It is to be remembered that it is not essential to the validity of a location that the discov-
ery shall have preceded or shall coexist with the posting of the notice and the demarka-
tion of boundaries. The discovery may be made subsequently, and when made operates
to perfect the location against all the world, saving those whose bona fide rights have
intervened. One who thus in good faith makes his location, remains in possession, and
with due diligence prosecutes his work toward a discovery, isfullyprotected against all
forms of forcible, fraudulent, surreptitious, or clandestine entries and intrusions upon his
possession.
Id. at -, 73 P. at 1084 (emphasis added).
52. 249 U.S. 337.
53. Id. at 347-48.
In the California courts the right of a locator before discovery while in possession of
his claim and prosecuting exploration work is recognized as a substantial interest, ex-
tending not only as far as thepedis possessio but to the limits of the claim as located; so
that if a duly qualified person peaceably and in good faith enters upon vacant lands of
the United States prior to discovery but for the purpose of discovering oil or other valua-
ble mineral deposits, there being no valid mineral location upon it, such person has the
right to maintain possession as against violent, fraudulent, and surreptitious intrusions so
long as he continues to occupy the land to the exclusion of others and diligently and in
good faith prosecutes the work of endeavoring to discover mineral thereon.
Id.
54. Id. at 348. For a discussion of what work the Mining Law of 1872 presently requires on
mining claims after discovery but prior to the obtaining of a patent, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 28-28e
(1976).
55. 249 U.S. at 348.
To what extent the possessory right of an explorer before discovery is to be deduced
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Ranchers Exploration and Development Co. v. Anaconda Co. 16 is illus-
trative:
Proposals for liberalizing the rule [pedispossessio ] have been
considered in the industry and studied by Congress. But even
with the press of modem demands and procedures, seemingly
it can be agreed upon neither in the industry nor in the Con-
gress. It would be presumptuous as well as unwarranted for
me to ignore the holding of the Supreme Court, [in Union Oil
Co. v. Smith] with its expressed limitations.5
The court in Ranchers Exploration and Development Co. went further,
interpreting Union Oil Co. as standing for the proposition that the pro-
tection of the doctrine ofpedispossessio could not be applied to a group
of claims without the elements of the doctrine being satisfied on each
individual claim within that group."8 Other courts have also made the
same determination,5 9 resulting in the development of a general judi-
cial reluctance to interpret Union Oil Co. differently."
from the invitation extended in § 2319 [30 U.S.C. § 22], to what extent it is to be re-
garded as a local regulation of the kind recognized by that section and the following
ones, and to what extent it derives force from the authority of the mining States to regu-
late the possession of the public lands in the interest of peace and good order,, are ques-
tions with which we are not now concerned. Nor needwe stop to inquire whether the
right is limited to the ground actually occupied in the process of exploration, or extends
to the limits of the claim. These questions and others that suggest themselves are not
raised by the present record, which concerns itself solely with the rights asserted by the
defendant under the Act of 1903.
Id.
56. 248 F. Supp. 708 (D. Utah 1965).
57. Id. at 721.
58. Id. The defendants, Anaconda Co. and others, had argued that the doctrine ofpedis
possessio could be applied to a group or area of claims provided that the three elements ofpedis
possessio were satisfied on some of the claims within the group or area. See notes 99-118 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the pros and cons of applying the doctrine ofpedis
possessio on a group or area basis rather than the traditional claim-to-claim basis.
59. See, e.g., Adams v. Benedict, 64 N.M. 234, 327 P.2d 308 (1958) in which it was stated:
The work done on other claims does not supply the requirement [of actual possession,
working towards discovery]. . . . Likewise, the possession of each claim, . . . must be
protected by actual occupation of that identical claim and the diligent and persistent
work thereon.
• . . To hold otherwise would allow a person to hold vast amounts of land by merely
claiming it without doing the work required by the rules. . . . It would encourage spec-
ulation ....
Id. at 317. But cf. Olson, New Frontiers in Pedr Possession: Mac Guire v. Sturgis, 7 LAND AND
WATER L. REV. 367, 375 (1972), who suggests that this language by the court was dictum and that
the issue of howpedispossessio applied to a group or area basis was not before the court. See also
Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1964).
60. See Geomet Exploration v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339
(1979).
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III. RECENT JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF PEDIS POSSESSIO
Not all courts, however, have interpreted Union Oil Co. v. Smith
61
in the same way as the court did in Ranchers Exploration and Develop-
ment Co. v. Anaconda Co. 62 The United States District Court of Wyo-
ming in MacGuire v. Sturgis63 extendedpedispossessio's protection to a
group of claims without requiring the doctrine's elements to be satisfied
on each individual claim within the group. That suit arose from a dis-
pute between MacGuire and Sturgis over 231 mining claims. Mac-
Guire had previously staked the claims in accordance with the
applicable Wyoming statutes but was not in actual possession of the
claims at the time of Sturgis' entry. The 231 claims were part of a
larger group of MacGuire's claims, and he was working towards min-
eral discovery on some of them. The issue before the court was
whether MacGuire's rights under the doctrine ofpedispossessio ex-
tended to the 231 disputed claims. In holding that his pedispossessio
rights did include the 231 claims, the Court relied on five factors: (1)
the geological similarity and reasonable size of the area claimed; (2) the
validation work required by the state statute had been completed; (3)
an overall work program for the area was in operation; (4) the work
program was being diligently pursued; and (5) the economic impracti-
cability of protecting only those claims in the actual possession of a
good faith prospector.'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Continental Oil Co. v. Na-
trona Service, Inc. 65 also appeared to be willing to apply the doctrine of
pedispossessio to a group or area basis where the five elements estab-
lished in MacGuire were satisfied.66 However, the court declined a re-
quest to write definitions and guidelines for the application of the
61. 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
62. 248 F. Supp. 708 (D. Utah 1965).
63. 347 F. Supp. 580 (D. Wyo. 1971).
64. Id. at 584-85.
Plaintiff is presently entitled to the exclusive possession ... on a group or area basis
where, as here, the following exists or was done for his benefit: (a) the geology of the
area claimed is similar and the size of the area claimed is reasonable; (b) the discovery
(validation) work referred to in Wyo. STAT. § 30-6 (1957) is completed; (c) an overall
work program is in effect for the area claimed; (d) such work program is being diligently
pursued; ie., a significant number of exploratory holes have been systematically drilled;
and (e) the nature of the mineral claimed and the cost of development would make it
economically impracticable to develop the mineral if the locator is awarded only those
claims on which he is actually present and currently working.
Id.
65. 588 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 797-98.
19811
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doctrine to a group or area basis. Instead, it chose to affirm the case on
the basis that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclu-
sion that there was a lack of good faith on the part of Continental Oil
Co., the party who sought the protection of the doctrine ofpedisposses-
,.67
Most recently, the case of Lucky Mc Uranium Corp. v. Geomet Ex-
ploration68 presented the United States Supreme Court with the oppor-
tunity to decide whetherpedispossessio's protection applied only on a
claim-by-claim basis or whether, under certain circumstances, the doc-
trine could extend to a group of claims without its elements being satis-
fied on each individual claim within the group. In August and
September of 1976, Lucky Mc Uranium conducted aerial and land ex-
plorations over large areas of the federally-owned Artillary Peak Min-
ing District in Arizona searching for anomalies indicative of uranium
deposits. 69 Based on the results of these tests, Lucky Mc Uranium pro-
ceeded to mark, post, drill and record, according to the applicable Ari-
zona statutes, 70 200 claims in the Artillary Peak Mining District.7  In
December, 1976, Geomet Exploration, aware of Lucky Mc Uranium's
claims but believing them to be invalid,72 entered upon one of these
67. Id. at 797-99.
68. 124 Ariz. 60, 601 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979), cert,
granted, 100 S. Ct. 3009, appeal dismissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3173 (Sept. 23, 1980) (pursuant to Sup. Ct.
R. 53, 9-12-80).
69. Modem sophisticated scintillation equipment was used in exploration for these anoma-
lies, which are physical differences between rock types or discontinuities in geological formations,
Id. at -, 601 P.2d at 1345.
70. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-202 to -204 (1978).
71. This equaled 4,000 acres, which was the maximum size allowed because no single placer
claim on the public land can exceed 20 acres. See 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1976).
72. The belief of Geomet Exploration that Lucky Mc Uranium's claims were invalid raised
the issue of good faith. The good faith issue pertains particularly to two of the three traditional
elements ofpedispossessio. The party seeking the doctrine's protection must not only be in actual
possession of the claims but also must, in good faith, be diligently working towards a discovery.
This is an objective test determined by the type and amount of work performed on the claims. See
Ranchers Exploration and Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708 (D. Utah 1965). However,
a party seeking to take over a mining claim that another allegedly claims to be his must enter that
claim in good faith. This is apparently a partly subjective and partly objective test. Mere knowl-
edge of another's claim prior to entry is not bad faith unless, of course, the party knows that the
other's claim is legitimate. However, whether one's pre-discovery claim is legitimate depends
upon whether the elements ofpedispossesslo have been satisfied (1e., whether the present claim-
ant is claiming in good faith). Id. at 727. See generally Fiske, supra note 7. Therefore, the good
faith issue turns upon how the court interprets the doctrine ofpedispossess/o. If it adheres to the
three traditional elements ofpedispossessio, then each must be satisfied for good faith to be found.
One cannot be in good faith diligently working towards discovery if he is not in actual possession
of the claim and any attempt to exclude another would necessarily be done in bad faith if any of
the first two elements are not satisfied. If the court does not adhere strictly to the three traditional
elements ofpedispossessio, then good faith is much easier to establish and conversely, bad faith by
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claims and began drilling activities. Later, Geomet located a total of
seven claims on the land already claimed by Lucky Mc Uranium.
When Geomet Exploration refused to vacate these claims, Lucky Mc
Uranium brought suit seeking exclusive possession of all 200 claims
under the doctrine ofpedispossessio. The trial court, recognizing the
group or area application of pedis possesslo, rendered judgment for
Lucky Me Uranium.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals dutifully noted the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Union Oil Co. v. Smith,7" the three basic elements of the doctrine of
pedispossessio outlined in that opinion, and the alleged danger of mis-
use of a more liberal doctrine of pedis possessio by a "non-diligent or
bad faith prospector."74 Although Lucky Me Uranium was not in ac-
tual physical possession of the seven disputed claims at the time of Ge-
omet Exploration's entry, the Court of Appeals held that Lucky Me
Uranium was in "actual physical occupancy" of its claims.75 In reach-
ing this decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that the five fac-
tors established in MacGuire v. Sturgis76 had been satisfied by Lucky
Me Uranium.77 Specifically, the court found that Lucky Me Uranium
had done the following: (1) posted and recorded notices of the 200
claims according to the applicable Arizona statutes; (2) begun drilling
deep exploration holes on some of the 200 claims; (3) established an
overall work program; (4) expended approximately $48,000 in the dis-
puted claim area and nearly $70,000 overall; and (5) located claims in
an area that was geologically similar and the size of its claims was rea-
sonable.78
the party seeking to enter the claimed area. Compare Geomet Exploration v. Lucky Mc Uranium
Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979) with Geomet Explanation v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp.,
124 Ariz. 60, 601 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App. 1979). The result is that until the scope of the doctrine of
pedispossessio is resolved a mineral prospector's pre-discovery claim may become the subject of
litigation unless he diligently adheres to the three traditional elements of pedis possessio. See
Fiske, supra note 7, at 216.
73. 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
74. 601 P.2d at 1346.
75. Id. The distinction between actual physical possession and "actual physical occupancy"
is more form than substance. Lucky Me Uranium was not physically on the seven disputed claims
when Geomet Exploration entered them, but the Arizona Court of Appeals found that what
Lucky Mc Uranium had done on those seven claims and on the other 193 claims was sufficient for
Lucky Mc Uranium to be in "actual physical occupancy" of all 200 claims. Contra, 124 Ariz. 55,
-, 601 P.2d 1339, 1341 (1979).
76. 347 F. Supp. 580, 584-85 (D. Wyo. 1971).
77. 601 P.2d at 1346-47.
78. 601 P.2d at 1346.
19811
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/5
TULSA LAW JOUR"AL
Geomet Exploration appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court,79
which reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, fearing speculator monopolization of the public land. The Ari-
zona Supreme Court's principle disagreement with its two lower courts
focused on their liberal interpretation and application of the elements
of the doctrine ofpedispossessio. In particular, the court stated "to
adopt the premise urged by Lucky [Lucky Mc Uranium] eviscerates the
actual occupancy requirement of pedis possesslo."80 The Arizona
Supreme Court held "that pedis possessio protects only those claims
actually occupied [provided also that work toward discovery is in pro-
gress] and does not extend to contiguous claims on a group or area
basis."'" The court was concerned that a liberalization of the doctrine
ofpedispossessio to cover a group of claims without requiring actual
occupancy of each claim in the group would result in speculator mo-
nopolization of the public land.82
Lucky Mc Uranium filed an appeal with the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari 3 and was scheduled to hear
arguments in the case during its 1980 term. The case, however, was
dismissed by the appellant, Lucky Mc Uranium, under Rule 53 of the
Supreme Court's rules, prematurely ending this opportunity for a judi-
cial resolution of the future application ofpedispossessio.*4
Despite the dismissal of Lucky Mc Uranium Corp. v. Geomet Ex-
ploration,85 our country's growing need for both "fuel and nonfuel"
minerals,8 6 and its related need to become less dependent on foreign
79. Geomet Exploration v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979).
80. Id. at 1341.
81. Id. at 1342.
82. Id.
83. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp. v. Geomet Exploration, 100 S. Ct. 3009, appeal dismissed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3173 (Sept. 23, 1980) (pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 53, 9-12-80).
84. For a discussion of this dismissal and this author's theory for such dismissal, see notes 19-
26 supra and accompanying text.
85. 124 Ariz. 60, 601 P.2d 1344 (Ct. App. 1979), 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979), cert.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 3009, appealdsmissed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3173 (Sept. 23, 1980) (pursuant to Sup. Ct.
R. 53, 9-12-80).
86. See note 27 supra. An example of a domestic fuel mineral that may play an important
role in alleviating our dependence on foreign oil is uranium, a mineral that is still covered by the
Mining Law of 1872. The difficulty of encouraging greater exploration for uranium on the public
land under the Mining Law of 1872, and the traditional doctrine ofpedispossesso was alluded to
by Olson, supra note 59, at 376:
mhe need for a solution to the problem of how to secure prediscovery possessory rights
so as to encourage uranium exploration and development, and correspondingly discour-
age claim jumpers and nuisance locators, but without opening the door to speculation
and monopoly has become more acute due to the increasing depth at which uranium is
found and the consequent rise in prediscovery exploratory costs.
[Vol. 16:488
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sources for these minerals 87 dictates that some change be made in the
Mining Law of 1872, to promote increased domestic hard rock mineral
exploration on the public land.18 Greater pre-discovery protection of a
prospector's claims would facilitate achievement of this goal, and pres-
ently, legislation appears to be the most viable means of providing this
protection.
IV A LEGISLATIVE CHOICE: LEASING VS. FREE ACCESS
A. Leasing
The idea of replacing the Mining Law of 1872 with a leasing sys-
tem is not novel, 89 and clearly, a lease would provide greater pre-dis-
covery protection than the doctrine of pedis possessio because the
lessee's claims would be protected for a specified period of time without
his having to be in actual possession and diligently working towards
discovery on each individual claim, simultaneously.
Leasing advocates argue that the Mining Law of 1872 does not
provide for: (1) effective multiple use of the public land; (2) adequate
environmental safeguards; (3) efficient allocation of scarce resources;
and (4) adequate information to be obtained to make rational decisions
about future energy development on the public land.90 Leasing sup-
porters also argue that the Mining Law of 1872 represents the last ves-
tige of the out-moded nineteenth-century national policy of free access
to the public land,91 and that today the public should receive a fair
return, in the form of lease royalties, from all the resources on the pub-
lic land, including those minerals covered by the Mining Law of 1872.92
Id.
87. For a discussion of our foreign dependency on "nonfuel" minerals and the domestic
availability of some of these minerals, both on federal and nonfederal lands, see U.S. MINERAL
VULNERABILITY, supra note 27, at 58-78.
88. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
89. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, note 4 supra.
Despite the changes which the 1872 Law [Mining Law of 1872] has undergone at the
hands of Congress, the judiciary, the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] and the For-
est Service, the pressure to reform or repeal the law has mounted .... Every session of
Congress since 1969, for instance, has seen legislation proposed to scrap the claim patent
system in favor of some form of leasing.
Id. at 10. See, e.g., Mineral Development on Federal Lands: Hearings on S. 1040, S 3085, and S.
3086 Before the Subcomna. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (S. 1040
and S. 3085 were the two leasing bills).
90. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 4, at 27-33.
91. The premise behind this nineteenth-century national policy was to encourage mineral
development on the public lands in the west. Id. at 3.
92. Id. at 30.
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Essentially, the reason leasing advocates want the present Mining
Law of 1872 abolished and replaced by a leasing system is that they
believe leasing would provide greater governmental control over the
mining industry's use of the public land.93 Not surprisingly, it is for
this same reason that much of the mining industry is opposed to a leas-
ing system for hard rock minerals,94 and it is the mining industry's op-
position that argues most effectively against leasing. After all, if the
goal is to encourage greater hard rock mineral exploration on the pub-
lic land, it is unlikely that a system which the industry opposes will
provide the incentive to achieve this goal.95
At one time, members of the mining industry also opposed leasing
because of the royalty payments associated with it.9 6 However, the re-
cent support by members of the mining industry for H.R. 5831, 91 the
latest attempt to repeal the Mining Law of 1872, suggests that a royalty
may no longer be as objectionable because that bill, while retaining the
right of free access to the public land, included a two percent royalty
provision."
93. Edwards, The 1969 View of the 1872 Law: Current Proposals to Modernize or to Replace
the GeneralMining Law, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 139, 141-45, 153 (1969); Hansen, Wy A
Location System for Hard Minerals?, 13 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 11 (1967).
94. See Edwards, supra note 93, at 153. See also Hearings on HA. 5831 andHR. 9292, supra
note 30 (statement and questioning of Howard L. Edwards).
We [Mr. Edwards was the Associate General Counsel for the Anaconda Co., and the
Chairman of the Public Lands Committee, American Mining Congress] believe that a
leasing system for hard-rock minerals would be tantamount to a moratorium on new
mineral exploration for years, perhaps a decade. All proposed leasing systems vest dis-
cretion in the Secretary [of Interior] to elect what lands should be leased and whether
particular leases should or should not be issued. Recent history demonstrates that Secre-
tarial discretion has resulted in the frustration of leasing processes.
The all important right of access and self-initiation of mining rights through the location
system and the right to patent a mining claim must be preserved. The alternative of a
leasing system ... is wholly unacceptable.
Id. 138-39, 142.
95. The importance of providing an incentive to encourage exploration for hard rock miner-
als has even been recognized by critics of the Mining Law of 1872: "Whatever system [leasing or
some other alternative] is agreed upon must provide the economic incentive to look for and de-
velop minerals." ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 4, at 27. Ultimately, it is not important
whether leasing might be an effective alternative; what is important is that the mining industry
perceives leasing as a bad alternative.
96. Edwards, supra note 93, at 151-52.
97. See note 30 supra.
98. See note 94 supra. Howard L. Edward's statement in support of H.R. 5831, which in-
cluded a royalty provision but retained free access, suggests a change in attitude, or perhaps, a
willingness to compromise on the royalty issue in return for retention of free access to the public
land.
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B. Free Access
Legislation amending the Mining Law of 1872 to include a more
liberal version of the judicial doctrine ofpedispossessio would proba-
bly provide the mining industry with the incentive to increase mineral
explorations on the public land. Presently, the incentive to increase
mineral explorations on the public land is inhibited because the pre-
discovery protection provided by the traditional doctrine ofpedspos-
sessio is generally applied only on a claim-to-claim basis rather than on
a group basis.99 Expansion of the doctrine ofpedispossessio's protec-
tion to a group or area of claims would mitigate the risk of pre-discov-
ery loss for failure to satisfy the three elements ofpedis possessio on
each claim within the group and would allow hard rock mineral pros-
pectors to engage in more innovative and extensive exploration pro-
grams without fear of losing their economic investment before actual
discovery. Expansion of the doctrine would also bring the Mining Law
of 1872 more into line with modem mining practices.'00
Any legislation, however, that retains the principle of free access to
the public land for mining purposes and also attempts to expand the
protection of the doctrine ofpedispossessio to a group claim basis will
be opposed. Not only will leasing advocates and other public land
users, viewing the free access principle as conflicting with the multiple
use concept, resist such legislation,' 0' but, those fearing that an ex-
panded prediscovery doctrine will lead to speculator monopolization of
99. See Crouch, Title to the Unpatented Mining Claim, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 879,
916 (1977).
The primary problem with relying on pedis possessio in a mining claim acquisition
program is that the protection of the doctrine is usually limited to individual claims.
Consequently, the elements of pedis possessio must be independently established for
each claim sought to be protected by the doctrine. Therefore, the doctrine is generally
inadequate to protect a locator's prediscovery possessory rights to an entire block of
claims. While the locator's pedis possessio rights may be transferred and assigned, the
doctrine of pedis possessio and the protection afforded thereby is of limited use to a
company contemplating the acquisition of a large block of claims which have not been
validly located by discovery and the accomplishment of the mechanical acts of location.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
100. See Geomet Exploration v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 60, 601 P.2d 1344 (Ct.
App. 1979). The court stated:
We point out this rather technical material [Lucky Mc Uranium's use of scintillation
equipment] to emphasize that the search for uranium is a far cry from the old prospector
on a burro searching with a pick and shovel for an outcrop of valuable mineral. Some of
the mining practices formulated under the General Mining Law of 1872 have little prac-
tical validity when applied to the modem search for uranium.
Id. at 1345.
101. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 4, at 27.
1981]
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the public land, will also combat its passage.10 2
The idea that the Mining Law of 1872's policy of free public land
access conflicts with the multiple use of the public land and that some-
how leasing of the public land would not, fails to consider two impor-
tant facts. First, not all public land is open for hard rock mining
purposes; 10 3 and secondly, on those lands that are open for hard rock
mining, a prospector, prior to discovery, has only the status of a licen-
see or tenant at will' 04 against the government and thus may be re-
moved from the public land by the United States.0 5 Even the pre-
discovery protection afforded bypedispossessio will not shelter a pros-
pector from such governmental removal action. Thus, much of the
governmental control over public land use that leasing allegedly would
provide already exists under the Mining Law of 1872.106
102. Geomet Exploration v. Lucky Me Uranium Corp., 124 Ariz. 55, 601 P.2d 1339 (1979).
The Arizona Supreme Court indicated its concern about this in stating:
If one may, by complying with preliminary formalities of posting and recording notices,
secure for himself the exclusive possession of a large area upon only a small portion of
which he is actually working, then he may, at his leisure, explore the entire area and
exclude all others who stand ready to peaceably and openly enter unoccupied sections
for the purpose of discovering minerals.
Id. at 1342.
103. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 600 (1922), appeal denied, 260 U.S. 711 (1923). The
Court held that the Mining Law of 1872 did not include land around the Capitol in Washington,
land in the Arlington National Cemetery, land in Yosemite and Yellowstone National Parks,
lands in military reservations in the western states, and to any other lands where the U.S. directs
that disposal be only under the laws. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 483
(1915), where the Court recognized the power of the President to withdraw lands from the Mining
Law of 1872's scope by proclamation. However, executive power to withdraw public land areas
"aggregating 5,000 acres or more" must now be approved by Congress. Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1976). See also note 3 supra.
104. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346 (1919).
105. See generally Tognoni, Rule of Man vs. The American Mining Laws: The Persecution and
Elimination of the Small Miner on Public Lands in the United States, 55 N.D.L. Rev. 339 (1979).
106. Many leasing advocates would disagree that adequate governmental control already ex-
ists as long as the mining industry, unlike any other major user of the public land, has free access
to any area of the public land. Conversely, members of the mining industry would argue that the
government's right to withdraw areas of the public land has been used to promote other uses of
the public land, at the expense of mining, despite full knowledge of our dependence on foreign
sources for minerals that could be mined domestically. Supportive of the mining industry's argu-
ment is the government's action concerning an area of public land in Montana (Stillwater Com-
plex) containing the richest platinum group metals deposit in the world, which was also being
considered for wilderness classification:
An interesting sidelight to the Stillwater Complex question was a December 5, 1977,
Director, Bureau of Mines, memo on a Forest Service environmental impact statement
on management of the Beartooth Face Planning Unit in which the Stillwater Complex
deposits occur. Because about one-half of the planning unit was classified as "roadless"
for consideration as Rare II Wilderness, the memo read: "In view of the excellent poten-
tial for chromite, platinum, copper, nickel, uranium, coal and petroleum in this area, we
would hope that whatever plan is finally adopted will allow sufficient latitude for min-
eral recovery in this highly, perhaps uniquely mineralized area." That memo was re-
turned by the Assistant Secretary to the Bureau of Mines for deletion of this statement.
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The fear that an expanded doctrine ofpedispossessio will lead to
speculator monopolization of the public land is not limited to the oppo-
nents of the Mining Law of 1872. Those supporting the Mining Law of
1872 and an expanded doctrine ofpedipossessio have recognized that
"the traditional purposes of the General Mining Law [free access to the
public land and the promotion of mineral exploration thereon] must be
considered at all times to determine whether or not a proposed ex-
tended or different application of pedis possessio is consistent with
[those traditional purposes]."' 7 Without adequate safeguards, an ex-
pansion ofpedispossessio could lead to monopolization of the public
land for purposes totally unrelated to mining, much to the chagrin of
the mining industry. Any attempt, therefore, to expand the protection
of pedis possessio beyond its claim-to-claim basis must provide ade-
quate safeguards against monopolization of the public land; not only to
allay the fears of the opposition, but also, to protect the major sup-
porter of an expanded doctrine, the mining industry.
The problem is how to incorporate into legislation expanding the
protection ofpedispossessio, regulations designed to control the use of
public land and protect against its monopolization, that are acceptable
to both the proponents and opponents of an expansion ofpedisposses-
sio and the Mining Law of 1872. It is suggested that much of the mu-
tual fear of public land monopolization and the concern over
conflicting uses of the public land can be allayed by including in legis-
lation the five factors established in MacGuire v. Sturgis as additional
elements'0 8 to be satisfied by a party seeking to avail himself of the
group or area protection provided by an expandedpedispossessio doc-
trine. Thus, the protection of the expanded doctrine ofpedispossessio
would be available only if-
(1) the area claimed is geologically similar and reasonable
in size;
(2) the validation work required by the state's statutes has
been completed;
(3) an overall work program for the area is in operation;
(4) the work program is being diligently pursued; and
(5) it is economically impracticable to protect only those
claims in the actual physical possession of the prospec-
U.S. MINERAL VULNERABILITY supra note 27, at 61-62 n.92.
107. Fiske, note 7 supra at 184.
108. The three traditional elements ofpedirpossessio: (1) actual possession; (2) diligent prose-
cution of work towards discovery; and (3) exclusion of others would also need to be satisfied but
(I) and (2) would need only to be satisfied on a portion of the claims. See note 46 supra.
1981]
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:488
tor. 10 9
These five factors, coupled with the government's already existing
authority to remove areas of the public land from the coverage of the
Mining Law of 1872, and to remove, prior to discovery, mineral pros-
pectors who fail to comply with the applicable statutory requirements,
may provide sufficient governmental control over hard rock mining on
the public land to appease the more reasonable opponents of the Min-
ing Law of 1872.110 More importantly, however, such control would be
more acceptable to the mining industry because it is achieved without
interference with the basic principle of free access to the public land." I I
It is this fact that makes the expanded doctrine of pedis possessio a
better legislative alternative than leasing.
One advantage that this proposal for expansion of pre-discovery
protection has over previous legislative attempts is that the distinction
between "assessment work, discovery work, andpedispossessio" is pre-
served." 2 In contrast, legislative bill S. 3086,1 13 while retaining the pol-
109. See note 64 supra.
110. Additional steps that could be taken in an effort to achieve an acceptable compromise
with the opponents of the Mining Law of 1872 would be to include a royalty provision and a
patent provision similar to those in H.R. 5831. H.R. 5831 provided for a two percent royalty to be
paid to the United States, and also apparently limited a miner's patent title to the interest in the
discovered mineral. See Hearings on H. 5831 and H.R 9292, supra note 30, H.R. 5831 §§ 8-10.
But § 8 of H.R. 583 1, entitled "Rights Granted by Mineral Patent" appears to grant title not only
to the mineral, but also to the remaining interests in the land. Id. However, the statement of
Howard L. Edwards, representing the American Mining Congress (the drafters of H.R. 583 1), to
the Subcommittee indicates that a mineral patent under H.R. 5831 was to be limited to the discov-
ered mineral.
Instead of a mineral patent granting full title to the land, as is now provided in the
present mining law, only a very limited title would be acquired under a patent. The
minerals would be patented. There would be reserved to the United States all leasing act
minerals, all gas and other minerals, and the bill provides for the restriction that the
lands could only be used for mining purposes; and if the lands were used for purposes
other than mining, the lands would revert to the United States.
Id. at 142.
111. See note 94supra for an indication of the importance of free access to the mining indus-
try.
112. See Fiske supra note 7, at 213, where he states:
There is some misunderstanding within the industry about the relationship of as-
sessment work, discovery work, and pedis possessio. Discovery alone of a valuable min-
eral will not put that substance into the national economy, even though vested rights are
earned by the discovery, so assessment work is provided for to induce development and
exploitation of the deposit. Therefore, by definition, the work necessary under pedis
possessio precedes discovery, that required for annual labor follows a discovery, and the
latter cannot meet the requirement for the former. Furthermore, work under pedis pos-
sessio must be diligent and persistent. The bona fide performance of what is denomi-
nated as assessment work, being specifically $100.00 worth of labor or improvement,
might be performed upon a claim in a single week, and the claim left idle for the balance
of the assessment year. This could be fatal under pedis possessio even though it would
preserve a post-discovery possessory right.
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icy of free access, attempted to expand pre-discovery protection by
replacing the three judicial elements ofpedispossessio 114 with a loca-
tion and assessment work requirement analogous to that found in the
Mining Law of 1872.115 Unlike the Mining Law of 1872, however, S.
3086 did not require mineral discovery, before annual assessment work
would suffice to protect the area claimed. 16 This would have enabled a
person to maintain control over the area without commencing explora-
tion activities, thereby making the danger of speculator monopolization
of the public land a very real possibility. Legislation that incorporates
the five elements established in MacGuire v. Sturgis117 as the test for
determining whether pre-discovery protection will be expanded to a
group of claims, would avoid this risk of monopolization, if compe-
tently administered.
V. CONCLUSION
Expansion of the doctrine of pedis possessio to a group or area
basis represents the simplest and, perhaps, most effective means of en-
couraging greater exploration for hard rock minerals on the public
land. But any attempt to increase mining activity on the public land
will be opposed by environmentalists and other users of the public
land.118 Therefore, any proposed legislation to expand the doctrine of
pedispossessio must include sufficient safeguards against misuse of the
public land to at least partially satisfy these opponents of increased
public land mining. Compromise, however, will not be easy.
Mining men are not callous to natural beauty or the heritage
owing to future generations. But it is impossible to establish
any meaningful dialogue with advocates of untouched wilder-
ness who argue for the preservation of more land to serve a
burgeoning population while refusing to recognize the practi-
cal problems of developing a mineral supply for the expanded
needs of that population. Unless reason overcomes passion,
"Discovery work" has been referred to as the work necessary to show good faith on the part
of a locator. Id.
113. See Mineral Development on Federal Lands: Hearings on S. 1040, S. 3085, and S. 3086
Be/ore the Subcomn on Minerals, Materials and Fuels, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
114. See note 7 supra.
115. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976).
116. See note 113 supra, at 74-75.
117. See note 64 supra. H.R. 5831 did incorporate the work plan requirement but only after
patent title had been obtained. See Hearings on H.A 5831 andHR 9292 supra note 30, H.R. 5831
§ 9. This requirement should be retained, but also applied prior to patenting.
118. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 4, at 27.
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there is no room for compromise between the philosophies of
mineral rights and scenic values. 119
While this language may appear somewhat dogmatic, it does recognize
the need for compromise, and without compromise, neither side of this
mining issue can hope to win. Ultimately, however, the responsibility
for forging a compromise does not lie with the mining advocates, or
their opponents. Rather, the people through their local, state, and fed-
eral governments must realistically look at the country's energy and
environmental needs and decide how to most effectively satisfy those
needs.
George R. Barr, Jr.
119. Hansen, supra note 93, at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 16:488
23
Barr: Hard Rock Mining on the Public Land: A Time for Compromise
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1980
